This paper argues that the growth and legalization of Political Islamism in Tunisia will naturally hinder the contemporary influence of violent extremism, leading to partnership and inclusion within a Democratic government. The basis for this claim rests on the idea that the condemnation and repression of Political Islamism in Tunisia historically backfired and led to the further underground radicalization of Tunisians, along with scores of human rights abuses by authorities. Specifically, this essay will focus on the moderate Islamist party Ennahda, the Salafist party Ansar al-Sharia, and their complex relationship to each other as well as to domestic and regional politics at large. Furthermore, this essay will examine the wide continuum of Political Islamism at present, including the Tunisian government's most recent agenda regarding its response to violent extremism, terrorism and acts of vigilante violence. This essay advocates for the Tunisian government to continue to allow the participation of Islamist groups within the political arena while maintaining security, transparency, and accountability for the state and its citizens.
within a Democratic government. The basis for this claim rests on the idea that the condemnation of Political Islamism in Tunisia historically backfired and led to the further underground radicalization of Tunisians, along with scores of human rights abuses by authorities. Scholar John Turner regards the theory allowing Islamist parties to participate openly in Tunisian politics as not only a "cure, but rather a beginning to a possibility" of democratic growth and sustainability within the Arab world. This essay will analyze the different historical and contemporary 1 factors that provide evidence for the partnership of Islamism and Democracy. Specifically, this essay will focus on the moderate Islamist party Ennahda, the Salafist party Ansar al-Sharia, and their complex relationship to each other as well as to Tunisian politics at large. Furthermore, this essay will examine the wide 2 continuum of Political Islamism at present, including the Tunisian government's most recent agenda regarding its response to violent extremism.
In order for a democratic government to progress organically in Tunisia, as well as elsewhere in the region, it is necessary for both the West as well as the Arab world to allow political Islamism to grow and advance. If this occurs, then political Islamism can work in cooperation with a democratic governing system, and benefit politicians and citizens alike. Indeed, "of all the developments that have impacted on the politics of the Maghreb states in the post-independence area, none has equaled that of Islamism." Throughout Tunisia's independence, 3 Islamist movements witnessed various cycles by the country's dominating regimes and were seen as a necessary "counterweight to the radical left" opposition. However, whenever a party spoke out or amassed a large following, 4 it was immediately seen as a threat by the regime, and a brutal crackdown ensued. This cycle seemingly came to a halt after Tunisia's recent uprising in 2011 -when Tunisia's moderate Islamist party Ennahda gained a majority vote in the state and took power in the transitional government's NCA. Ennahda led the NCA from November 2011 though January 2014, before an interim independent government took over to lead the state until its late 2014 elections. While the majority leader of the NCA, Ennahda formed a coalition government with two non-Islamist parties -the Congress for the Republic and Ettakatol. However, since 2011 the Tunisian government continues to grapple with divisions among its elected parties, as well as outlying parties including Salafists -some of whom the Independence to the Arab Spring., (New York: Columbia UP, 2012), 155. Ibid., 156. 4 government labels as violent extremists or jihadists. As Ennahda struggles to maintain popularity and promote its democratic ideals, it must also resist the past errors of Tunisian regimes; while maintaining a safe and transparent political platform, the Tunisian government must continue to allow more conservative Islamist groups into the political arena, so long as they do not pose a threat to the dissolution of the state's democratic stability. Thus, it is necessary to provide free and fair elections where a variety of opinions can be heard and judged openly by the state's residents -and not to preemptively ban political parties purely out of oppositional fear.
THE BASIS FOR AN ISLAMIST SOCIETY
The region known as the Maghreb encompasses the North African states of Mauritania, Libya, Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. Specifically in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, Islamism has come to represent the main opposition force, and thereby constitutes the "most significant political challenge" that each state has grappled with during post-colonialism. mandate in effect allowed the Bourguiba regime to control the public sphere of religion. Overall, these reforms symbolized a vital turning point in the devastation of traditional Islam in the state. The reforms led to the regime's "administrative monopolization of Islam," and furthermore included "the termination of religious endowments, the abolition of Qur'anic schools as well as the legal prohibition of any activity in mosques other than prayer. Even religious instruction was subject to prior administrative sanction." Bourguiba's "forceful modernization policies 27 irked the then most dormant religious reformist current in Tunisia." These 28 policies likely influenced formerly moderate Muslims into political -and sometimes violent -action, because they felt that their religion was being both controlled and limited by the ruling regime. Thereby, "the Tunisian religious movement, which was initially concerned with cultural, social, and religious issues, inched its way into the political arena, expressing opposition to the left and later to the increasingly authoritarian state under Bourguiba."
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Upon Ben Ali's swift rise to presidency in 1989, thousands of imprisoned Islamist Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique (MTI) activists were released, and Willis, 157. 23 Mabrouk, 50. 24 Historically, the Zaytouna mosque holds a significant affiliation with MTI -Mouvement de la
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Tendance Islamique -the Islamist party's roots were planted by individuals associated with the mosque, who, with a foundation of young students, formed a group that would go on to transform into the Islamist party Ennahda. Mabrouk, 51. 26 Ibid., 52. In an attempt to yet again "religiously cleanse" Tunisia in the early 1990s, Ali's regime adopted a policy to "target the 'sources' which…fertilized political Islam." The new program targeted books, school programs, newspapers, and 35 mass media. This "pedagogical purification" went on to include measures that abused the fundamental human rights of Tunisians -such as banning traditional head-shawls and the growing of a beard. However, the de-Islamization process adopted by Tunisia did not rid the state of Political Islamism as intended, but rather had a reverse effect. As explained by Willis: It "encouraged the blossoming of radical Salafism. This was the real and perverse consequence of the cruel and violent cleansing process. The disappearance of Ennahda from the political scene Willis, 167. 30 Ibid., 134. in Tunisia after 9/11, when a hastily created anti-terrorism law was enacted. The vague policies put in place under the name of "anti-terrorism" removed regime and government personnel of any accountability. Ultimately, the law became a "suppressive security policy" that "ended up creating a political vacuum and closed any space for debate," whereby further repression and media censorship followed. Moreover, the attacks gave Ben Ali's regime the opportunity to 40 portray itself to Western allies as a "seasoned bulwark against the threat of attempted to receive recognition and legalization from the state's interim government. Some of these groups continue to be labeled as "extremist," as well as "militant" by the government and news media. Although Ennahda initially supported legalization for many of these opposing parties during 2011-2012, the last two years proved tumultuous in regards to Ennahda's popularity and reputation -as well as to the party's relationship to Salafists. Until recently, Ennahda viewed the inclusion of Salafist parties as a vital step towards a comprehensive democratic government. Cavatorta outlines Ennahda's agenda regarding Salafism as the following:
First, there is a degree of understanding of the radical positions of the Salafists. Many Ennahda members used to hold similar views in the past and have come around to different methods and policies rather recently. Second, the inclusion of Salafists in the political games might benefit Ennahda electorally, given that the radicalism of Salafists would be neutered; having joined the Willis, 191 . political system, Salafists would no longer seem so radical. Finally, Ennahda can use Salafists to provide a more moderate image of itself, arguing that it is defending democracy and human rights by acting as a rampart against Salafism. 49 Furthermore, Ennahda worries that banning Salafist groups, such as AST, will merely push the movements further towards violence. Instead, Ennahda -and other moderate Islamist movements -initially encouraged Salafist groups to engage in the democratic arena. Formally recognized Salafi parties continue to 50 lack popular support, especially among younger, more radical Tunisians, who may view the parties as a "contradiction in terms," and "vehemently reject…the institutionalization of party politics." While leading the NCA, Ennahda 51 continued to face criticism and skepticism in regards to its relationship to -and tolerance of -Salafist parties. Opponents accused Ennahda of failing to take a hard public stance against Salafi groups suspected of committing violent attacks.
Although rising numbers of Salafi parties were initially welcomed to Tunisia's new political forum, the parties have since become a growing -and often violent -challenge for Ennahda and Tunisia's government at large. "At the very least, Tunisian secularists and liberals believe Ennahda has failed to identify and punish Salafi groups or individuals who have violently attacked activists and intellectuals." Vocal opponents of Ennahda may go so far as to accuse the party 52 of actively engaging in "double-talk -assuring the Tunisian and international communities of its moderate outlook, but using Salafis and their bursts of violence to further Islamic influence in government institutions." Some opposition groups 53 went so far as to call for Ennahda to step down, as well as for the dissolution of the NCA. Once again, Ennahda conceded to these demands and peacefully stepped down. Opponents argue that Ennahda, in an effort to appeal to a wider Government officials need to address Tunisia's security challenges, but without shutting out religious groups who could still turn out to be peaceful. A nuanced security policy meant to distinguish between Tunisia's enemies and devout masses is needed to prevent escalation and ensure stability. 56 Moreover, Merone describes AST as a group predominantly comprised of young, working-class Muslims. The political party is "rooted in the disenfranchised neighborhoods of the country. A mix of social marginalization and loss of hope brought many to join its ranks." Despite recent theories and accusations that 57 AST maintains an "armed wing" and preaches violence, Merone argues that Ansar al-Sharia instead supports jihad (literally -"struggle") solely through peaceful means -such as proselytizing, preaching, and organized charity (dawa). The party's rhetoric is founded on the Prophet Muhammad's strong concept of patience. Although this may be true in concern to the group's official agenda, skepticism abounds concerning AST's clandestine structure. There continues to be speculation over AST's budget, and where its resources (both monetary and written) come from. Aaron Zelin, among others, claims that much of AST's literature (which is often criticized by opponents as propaganda) is published in Saudi Arabia, and is likely donated to the organization. Additionally, much of AST's food and medicinal provisions appear to be donated by a Kuwaiti Salafi charity. Zelin also attributes funding for new Salafist-supported mosques in 58 Tunisia as being imported from Gulf countries, though concrete proof is difficult to come by. Regional instability continues to affect Tunisia, allowing for the 59 influx of ideologies and outsiders' influential agendas. Gulf countries, specifically Much of this violence should be considered to be vigilante Salafist violence, meaning it is not necessarily tied to, or carried out by, a specific group (such as AST). However, the perpetrators may often claim to associate with, or be active members of Salafist parties or organizations, which makes their actions more complicated. These acts of religiously motivated violence -which may include public beatings, aggressive protests, threats, or assassinations -predominately target women, secularists, social justice activists, artists, educators, foreigners, Sufis and other religious minorities, as well as more reform-minded Muslims and Imams. However, the incidents that have received the most media attention have 63 been the assassinations of dominant secular politicians, and a violent incident at the U.S. embassy in Tunis on 14 of September 2012. Following the violent protests at the U.S. embassy where two deaths occurred, the Ennahda-led government finally took a firm stance by conducting "sweeping arrests" of Salafists, primarily self-proclaimed members of AST. This massive and sudden 64 series of arrests involved detainment of nearly 200 suspected Salafists on "vaguely substantiated charges," and ended up resulting in a hunger strike among prisoners, whereby two detainees died. evidence that the group "played a major role" in the organization of protests, and the clashes with security forced that escalated into violence. According to eyewitnesses, AST protestors initiated the violence against security that premeditated an attack on the embassy (Gartenstein-Ross et al). Marks, 112. Although recent violence at the Algerian border dates back to a Tunisian military officer's death by a militant in December 2012, tensions escalated over the next few months. May, 2013 marks the period when Tunisia's government began to clamp down on Salafists -specifically AST members. That month, a bloody skirmish broke out involving Tunisian security forces and a jihadist group called Katibat Uqbah Ibn Nafi, whose members are comprised of Algerian, Tunisian, and Libyan nationals. The incident took place around the Jebel Chambi Mountain on Tunisia and Algeria's border. Tunisian forces allegedly attacked the area with heavy artillery in order to uncover jihadist-training camps. The security operation lasted approximately two weeks, and both sides endured heavy injuries, with five Tunisian soldiers reportedly requiring limb amputations after the event due to the presence of improvised explosive devices. Just two months later, in July, yet another attack occurred in the Jebel Chambi region, this time militants killed eight Tunisian soldiers -five of whom had their throats slit. Although the 66 Tunisia government linked AST to the violence at Jebel Chambi, AST's leaders deny these accusations and have not sought recognition for the aforementioned attacks.
Moreover, two high-profile political assassinations in 2013 caused a major blow to the public's confidence in its government. On February 6, 2013, secularist politician Chokri Belaïd was shot and killed. Directly following the murder, Tunisia witnessed a massive eruption as one million outraged and grieving citizens took to the streets in protest. Much of their anger and grief was directed at the ruling Ennahda government, believing the party was too "soft" on Salafists and violent Islamists, and that enough precaution wasn't taken to prevent the murder. Approximately six months later, on July 25, Mohammed Brahmianother secularist politician -was murdered. More protests broke out across the state, including angry calls from protesters demanding the government's resignation. In response, the government went on to publicly link AST to both the assassinations, as well as the violent attacks at Jebel Chaambi. On August 27, AST was formally labeled a terrorist organization. Many questions remain unanswered regarding the multiple bloody attacks. It seems likely that members of AST are linked to the murders, but there is less evidence that AST as a group formally ordered or organized the killings. Some critics of the government believe that the blame is being placed too quickly on a perpetrator (in this case, AST) in order to deflect blame from the government, and to maintain an illusion of security in the unstable state. Conspiracy theories and blame linked to the Gartenstein-Ross, et al. 67 multiple violent murders in 2013 protruded in various directions. While some secularists blamed Ennahda outright for the assassinations, multiple members of Ennahda actually voiced concerns that members of the "old regime" manipulated or coerced Salafists to commit the acts of violence in order to emphasize the fragility and insecurity of the state.
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Since May of 2013, over 2,000 Salafis have been arrested for either direct or indirect involvement in various acts of violence. Is the "hard-line" approach 69 working? Or is the Tunisian government continuing to disenfranchise its younger, struggling, more impressionable citizens and lose their support to extremist organizations? One of Tunisia's 'most wanted men,' Ahmed Rouissi, was killed recently fighting for The Islamic State (referred to as both "ISIL" and "ISIS"). The Tunisian government believed he was involved in the 2013 political assassinations of Belaïd and Brahmi. As of yet, no one has been convicted for these murders, so it remains questionable what the mass arrests of Salafists from 2013 -2015 accomplished.
YET ANOTHER CYCLE OF RELIGIOUS OPPRESSION?
Tunisia's recent crackdown on Salafism, including the branding of AST as an illegal terrorist organization, is extremely reminiscent of the state's previous banning of MTI (and Ennahda) decades earlier -including the mass-arrests and broad accusations brought upon the party's members. Rather than allowing the party to continue operating publicly with some degree of transparency, the government has instead pushed AST underground while thereby "encouraging small groups of radicalized people to move without a political guide." Although 70 splinter organizations with extremist members have been identified as threats to the state -as well as to the security of secular and leftist Tunisian politicians -no evidence has yet been presented publicly to link the Salafist party Ansar al-Sharia to violent activity or state terrorism per se. While violent acts of extremism associated with both groups and individuals should be watched closely, attention should also be paid to the state's police and security responses. Merone writes:
We cannot settle the question [of Salafism or jihadism] by simply saying that these are 'terrorist groups' that have to be eliminated from society. More consciousness of the need to integrate these young people is needed, along with an open cultural debate: Islam must be discussed openly in order for it to evolve in Tunisia's new democratic context. 71 Merone maintains, "There is no solution but accountability," and goes on to emphasize that "the only way to overcome the crisis is to open up room for mediation that will allow the moderate camp within Ansar al-Sharia to develop a clear platform condemning violence in order to declare itself a legal organization." If this happens, then AST will be able to interact with 72 transparency within Tunisia's future democratic government as well as its society.
During these recent years of vigilantism and violence, the government has frequently been accused of not taking a hard enough stance on Salafists, and the police and security forces within the state have repeatedly come under scrutiny for their lukewarm response and inaction, especially by the international Human Rights Watch (HRW) organization. In order to maintain safety and security in Tunisia, especially among its minorities and vulnerable citizens, the state must do more to train and support its police at a local and national level, while maintaining transparency rather than promoting mass arrests and incarcerations under the guise of "anti-terrorism," as occurred in the two prior administrations. "In order to blunt the force of Salafi-associated unrest, the Tunisian government must adopt a transparent and consistent policy to enforce the rule of the law." Ibid. to connect with other regional Islamist groups -many of whom have much more violent agendas and are actively recruiting fighters. The day after the Bardo Museum attack, ISIL (also referred to as ISIS) claimed responsibility. The two gunmen responsible for the attack were killed at the scene, and nine further arrests were made shortly thereafter. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Both Ennahda, and the new ruling party Nidaa Tounes must form a productive unity government that restores justice and public confidence within the state. The new government must establish firm security policies while seeking a compromise between being seen as "soft" on or "sympathetic" to Salafists, and refrain from the manipulation of "anti-terrorism" laws in order to further its own political agenda or conduct sweeping, repressive arrests without the agency for fair, transparent trials. "To deal with the problem of radical Salafism, the Tunisian government has to undertake security sector reform and address the socioeconomic conditions that drive people toward extremist positions," furthermore, the government must attempt to "restore state authority without falling into the traps of overreaction, abuse of human rights, and indiscriminate repression" which plagued the state during the past fifty years. The root of vigilante violence and radicalization of 81 Tunisians appears to stem predominantly from socioeconomic conditions, rather than religion itself. Vulnerable individuals and communities may thereafter adopt radical political and religious beliefs and agendas as they feel they have been let down by their society and government. In order for a coalition or unity government to be successful it must strive to overcome the polarizing distinction between Islamists and secularists and instead work collaboratively to improve the lives of Tunisian citizens on multiple levels.
Despite the fact that Tunisia's political transition was not flawless, it was indeed peaceful and transparent and will ideally set the stage for other regional neighbors to follow in the near future. Does the new government represent a return to the old regime? It is too soon to say, but the mere fact that the ruling government is inclusive of moderate Islamists and smaller independent parties is promising for the country's future, which will hopefully be more open to dialogue regarding political and religious diversity. Democratic change in a formerly authoritarian nation will only emerge gradually -much like it has developed in other countries. In order for a new government to succeed, the West must accept the elected governing bodies as the genuine voice of the voters and citizens of each individual society. Moreover, while it is tempting to hold Tunisia and its neighboring post-revolutionary states up to unrealistic standards and ideals, it is vital to remember that long-established Western (and Eastern) countries have only reached democratic governments through centuries of racism, sexism, slavery, and genocide. As noted by scholar Noueihed, "A new political system can be installed in a short time, but social customs and prejudices are often much slower to change." Although it is crucial to allow a natural cycle of political triumphs and 82 failures to occur within a newly independent nation, it is also essential for Ennahda, Nidaa Tounes, and their coalition government to not automatically heed to media or international pressure against political parties that are attempting to participate in the state's political arena. Within Tunisia's current political landscape there remains hope that democratic principles will spread throughout the Middle East and that "violent Islamism will be dealt a heavy blow not by the West, but by the people of the Middle East themselves…Which form of political Islam comes to gain the strongest appeal in the future will depend in part on whether or not Political Islam is afforded a legitimate place in the governments of the future." Although it is difficult at this point in time to draw a concrete 83 conclusion pertaining to the future of Salafism -or political Islamism at large -in Tunisia's political landscape, it is necessary to watch and indeed question the state's treatment of all current political parties and Islamist movements. Noueihed, 278. 82 Ibid., 177-8. 83 
